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Abstract
This article analyses the impact of ownership structure on investments in a three-party supply
chain from an incomplete contracting perspective. Circumstances are determined in which a
marketing cooperative is the unique first-best ownership structure.
1Ownership Structure in Agrifood Chains: The Marketing Cooperative
1. Introduction
In recent years, vertical co-ordination or integrated supply chain management has received much
attention of economists and management scholars studying the agrifood sector Changes in the
market for agrifood products, in farm support policies, in consumer demand and in technological
development require more collaboration in the agrifood supply chain (Downey). Contract-
regulated production and trade are replacing spot market transactions (Martinez and Reed).
More co-ordination and collaboration may lead to improved efficiency in the production and
distribution channel and to more product and market innovations (Galizzi and Venturini). These
vertical relationships can take many forms, like strategic alliances, long-term contracts, licensing,
subcontracting, joint ventures and franchising (Mahoney and Crank).
Increasing vertical co-ordination of production, distribution and marketing among firms in
a supply chain may have an impact on the investment decisions of each firm individually. Invest-
ments by a firm in one stage of the chain must be co-ordinated with investments by firms in other
stages in order to obtain optimal chain performance. As there are complementarities among the
activities of different chain participants, the investments are of a relationship-specific kind. In other
words, vertical co-ordination may increase asset specificity. The central question of this paper is
how different ownership structures affect the investment incentives of firms participating in specific
agrifood supply chains. In addressing this question, we apply incomplete contract theory as de-
veloped by Grossman and Hart and Hart and Moore.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we present a conceptualisation of
a three party supply chain. Where incomplete contract models have mainly been developed on
the basis of two parties engaged in a vertical or lateral relationship, in this paper we develop a
model with three parties. Second, the three-party model is used to analyse the efficiency of own-
ership structures in the agrifood sector, particularly the farmer-owned marketing cooperative.
The paper consists of eight sections. Section 2 gives a stylized example of the type of ag-
rifood chain we are studying and the investment decisions of its participants. Section 3 briefly
presents the incomplete contract theory of the firm. Section 4 introduces the model for analysing
efficient ownership structures. Section 5 presents the model for two parties. while section 6
develops the model for the three-party agrifood chain. In section 7 comparative statics results are
formulated. Section 8 provides conclusions.
2. A stylized example
An example of an agrifood chain with  complementarities in the activities of the chain participants
can be found in the production and marketing of organic food. Consider  three parties – grower,
processor and retailer – agreeing on an exclusive relationship to produce organic tomato salad.
The grower decides to produce organic tomatoes, to be processed into tomato salad by the
processor, and to be sold by the retailer. Before he can harvest the first tomato, the grower has to
make a significant investment in shifting from conventional to organic farming. Most of this invest-
ment is in obtaining appropriate knowledge. His newly acquired knowledge is related to the land
he owns and is worthless if he has no access to the land.
The grower’s products will be processed in separate processing lines and will be sold
2through separate marketing initiatives. Thus, the special activities of the processor and the retailer
lead to the highest total (i.e. chain) surplus. Assuming that the grower will receive part of the
revenues generated in the processing and retail stages of this chain, he will invest more if he is part
of this specific chain than if he is part of some generic chain. Thus, the investment by the grower is
(at least partially) chain-specific.
The chain-specific nature of the grower’s investment means that his investment will yield a
significantly lower return if the processor and/or the retailer renege on the contract. Thus, a kind
of dependency has been created between the grower on the one hand and the processor and
retailer on the other hand. An opportunistic contract party may take advantage of this depend-
ency relationship, for instance if market conditions have changed. Once the farmer has done his
(sunk) investment, the processor or retailer may demand a larger part of the total chain surplus
under the threat of discontinuing the contract alltogether. Such opportunistic behaviour is always
possible as no contract can cover all future contingencies. Particularly in situations of great uncer-
tainty and market volatility, opportunities for contract reneging increase.
This uncertainty about the future behaviour of his contract partners may induce the grower
to lower his investment or to take precautionary measures to prevent ending up in a situation that
other parties can appropriate a large part of the surplus of his investment. For instance, he may
decide to do the processing of tomatoes into tomato salad himself, and he may even sell the
tomato salad himself. What this really means is that the grower may set up or acquire processing
and retailing assets. Farmer co-operatives are an example of such investments by agricultural
producers in processing and marketing stages of the agrifood chain.
In this paper we do not only look at the chain-specific investment by the grower, but also
by the processor and retailer. A processor can make a chain-specific investment, for instance in
R&D that yields a special processing technology for organic produce (e.g. low energy use in
processing). This technology is related to the equipment or a patent that the processor already
owns. From this investment, too, complementarities (or positive externalities) in the chain may
arise. For instance, the new processing technology yields a higher return if the grower coordinates
his harvesting activities with the processing activities. Finally, the retailer may invest in setting up a
marketing campaign that attracts customers willing to pay a higher price for organic tomato salad.
The marketing campaign is related to the company name and its image. This investment, too, is
chain-specific, because it generates a higher total surplus if the farmer and the processor guaran-
tee the continuous supply of organic tomato salad.
Before we introduce our model for analysing the relationship between ownership structure
and efficient investment decisions, we will briefly introduce incomplete contract theory. Our paper
builds upon the ideas developed in this strain of economic organisation theory.
3. Incomplete Contract Theory
The incomplete contract theory starts from the basic idea that it is often difficult to write enforce-
able comprehensive contracts. Real world contracts are almost always incomplete in the sense
that there are inevitably circumstances or contingencies left out of the contract, because they were
either unforeseen or simply too expensive to enumerate in sufficient detail. As contracts are in-
complete, actions and payments must often be determined ex post, either unilaterally or through
negotiation. Consequently, contracting parties should be concerned ex ante with the threat of
opportunistic behaviour and the results of possible renegotiation. This is particularly problematic if
3ex ante specific investments have to be made. These investments create the opportunity for hold
up, i.e. ex post appropriation of quasi-surplus (i.e. specific investment costs plus surplus) by the
non-investing contract party. As a result, incomplete contracts may lead to under-investment in
the economic relationship. Klein et al. and Williamson (1979, 1985) have suggested that vertical
integration may solve this inefficiency problem.
Grossman and Hart have argued that vertical integration brings costs as well as benefits.
To understand what is changing when two firms merge, Grossman and Hart and Hart and Moore
have developed a property rights theory of the firm. A firm is identified with a collection of non-
human assets under common ownership, where ownership means holding residual rights of con-
trol. Residual rights are all rights to an asset that are not expressly assigned to another party
(including the state). The allocation of residual rights of control has effect on the bargaining posi-
tion of parties to a contract after they have made relationship-specific investments. In the absence
of comprehensive contracts, property rights largely determine which ex post bargaining position
will prevail. A party owning assets that are essential for value creation in the relationship is in a
position to reap at least some of the benefits from the relationship, which were not explicitly
allocated in the contract, by threatening to withhold the assets otherwise. Thus, a shift of owner-
ship affects the ex ante investment incentives of contract parties.1
4. The model: structure
The standard model of incomplete contract theory consists of a three stage non-co-operative
game. The first stage consists of the choice of ownership structure, where each ownership struc-
ture is associated with a specific distribution of bargaining power. The second stage consists of
the specific investment decision(s). The third stage consists of the choice of the non-investor
between honouring the contract and renegotiating it.
This game is solved by the method of backward induction. We start therefore with the
third stage. Two parties, for instance a farmer and a food procesor, may sign a contract before
investment by the farmer takes place. A contract may specify ex ante, i.e. before the investment
decision, that each party receives ex post, i.e. after the investment decision, half of the surplus.
The problem with this contract is that situations may arise for which the contract does not specify
anything, e.g. consumer demand is lower than expected. The (opportunistic) processor will argue
that the quasi-surplus instead of the surplus has to be divided in such situations. The specificity of
assets has weakened the ex post bargaining position of the farmer to such an extent that he will
accept these new terms regarding the exchange. The subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in the
third stage is therefore to renegotiate the ex ante contract.
The investment decision in the second stage of the game determines the bargaining posi-
tions in the third stage. The specificity of the investment puts the investor in a weak bargaining
                                                
1 The main Grossman/Hart/Moore conclusions on optimal asset ownership in a two party vertical
relationship (i.e. buyer-seller relationship) are the following. (1) A party with an important invest-
ment (in human capital) should have ownership rights over the asset for which the investment is
required. (2) If investments by party A become relatively more important than investments by party
B, A should own more assets. (3) Highly complementary assets should be under common owner-
ship. (4) Independent assets should be separately owned. (5) Important assets should not by owned
by a third party.
4position regarding the division of the surplus in the third stage. However, the investor anticipates
that the other party may take advantage of the incompleteness by claiming a larger share of the ex
post surplus than initially agreed upon. This fear of ex post opportunistic behaviour results in
underinvestment. This is the hold-up problem (Klein et al., 1978).
In the first stage of the game, the choice of ownership structure is chosen. It is assumed in
the incomplete contracting theory that an ownership stucture is chosen efficient. Every ownership
structure is associated with a particular distribution of bargaining power. In order to capture
bargaining power, we adopt the game theoretic solution concept Shapley value (Shapley), just
like the seminal article by Hart and Moore (1990).
5. The model: two parties
There are two parties (1 and 2), two assets (A1 and A2) and two investment decisions (x1 and
x2). For simplicity, xi can only take the value 0 or 1. Each party represents a specific stage of
production. For instance, party 1 is a farmer and party 2 is a processing firm. The assets are, for
instance, land and factory. The investment is done by a person and cannot be done by another
person, thus the investment is (at least partially) in human capital. The investment is related to a
specific non-human asset, i.e. the investment does not generate any surplus if the investing party is
denied access to the asset. For instance, the farmer invests in enhancing land productivity and the
processor invests in improving processing technology.
The model consists of two steps: an ownership structure step and an investment step. We
make the following assumptions about investment (x). Investments are made simultaneously and
non-cooperatively (i.e. each party invests without taking into account the choices of the other
parties). Investments are observable but not verifiable. This means that no contract can be written
about the precise investments, but that parties can observe each other’s investments once they
have been made. The observability implies that bargaining at T1 takes place under symmetric
information about the T0 investments. No contracts are possible about cost sharing at T0 or bene-
fit sharing at T1. As contracts at date T0 about the division of value generated by the investments
are necessarily incomplete, the division of value at date T1 depends on the bargaining power of
the parties.
We assume complementarities in asset use. An investment by party 1 generates a higher
value if not only asset A1 but also A2 is used. Similarly for an investment by party 2: it generates a
higher value if more assets are used.
As the generation of maximum value depends on the use of assets belonging to another
stage of the chain, the investments are chain-specific. The value generated by a specific invest-
ment is the quasi-surplus (q), being the surplus plus that part of the investment that is sunk in the
relationship. The actual value of q depends on who invests and which assets are used. We as-
sume that party 1 generates a quasi-surplus of t when A1 is used and 2t when both assets are
used. Similarly, we assume that party 2 generates a quasi-surplus of f when A2 is used and 2f
when both assets are used. The quasi-surplus for various investment decisions and various assets
used is shown in table 1. The full quasi-surplus of each investment will be generated only when all
assets are used.
Table 1.  Quasi-surplus for two investment decisions and various assets involved
5assets involved investment decision q
A1 x1=1 t
A1  A2 x1=1 2t
A2 x2=1 f
A1  A2 x2=1 2f
Various divisions of asset ownership are possible. We have distinguished 3 different ownership
structures. Figure 1 shows for each of the three ownership structures the assets that each party
owns. Ownership structure I represents market exchange. Forward integration is captured by
ownership structure II. It is an expression of the agricultural marketing cooperative, where farm-
ers own the processing or trading company at the second stage of the chain. Thus, in a marketing
cooperative party 1 owns A1 and A2. Finally, ownership structure III represents backward inte-
gration.
         I       II        III
party 1 :        A1    A       a
party 2  :       A2     a          A
a : asset, non-owner
A : asset, owner
: combined ownership
Figure 1. Three owhership structures
The bargaining power of each party in the supply chain under the various ownership structures is
captured by its Shapley value.  The Shapley value is computed for each ownership structure and
each investment by using the characteristic function. A characteristic function v assigns a number
to every coalition S, given a particular ownership structure G and given investment choices x.
Formally, v (S | G, x). This number is the total value generated by the parties in the coalition S
without any help from the parties outside of S; S is the coalition of parties (with S Í S; S being
the set of all parties). G is the ownership structure, i.e. the allocation of asset ownership. Table 2
presents the characteristic function and the corresponding Shapley value (SV) for each investment
decision and all ownership structures. This entails 6 cases.
6Table 2. Characteristic functions and Shapley values
G x1 x2 v(f ) v(1) v(2)  v(12) SV1 SV2
I 1 0 0 t 0 2t 1.5t 0.5t
II 1 0 0 2t 0 2t 2t 0
III 1 0 0 0 0 2t t t
I 0 1 0 0 f 2f 0.5f 1.5f
II 0 1 0 0 0 2f f f
III 0 1 0 0 2f 2f 0 2f
The Shapley value is a measure of power in the ex post bargaining process.2 It specifies for each
party the size of the quasi-surplus that this party will receive in the bargaining process. Therefore,
the Shapley value determines the maximum costs of investment the party is willing to make. If we
denote the sunk cost (or specific) part of the investment as ‘k’, then the (investment) participation
constraint3 for party 1 under ownership structure I is
k1 £ 1.5t.
Efficient ownership structures (with two parties)
An ownership structure is first-best efficient if both parties invest and each investment generates
surplus, i.e. if x = (1,1) and ki £ qi, for i = 1,2. To find out whether a particular combination of
investments will yield the first-best, we use the participation constraints of the two parties, i.e. k1
£ SV1, and k2 £ SV2.
                                                
2 In our model we have assumed that a specific farmer is trading with a specific processor, and that
each investment is specific to this trade relationship, in the sense it generates a higher surplus in this
particular relationship than in trade with a third party. However, substitutability of farmers and
processors can be easily incorporated in the model. We will outline this for the non-investor as well
as the investor. Substitutability of a particular party reduces its Shapley value in two ways when the
party is a non-investor. First, an increasing number of substitutes for a particular party reduces the
Shapley value of all these substitutes jointly. The reason is that the probability increases that a
particular order of the grand coalition has the feature that one of these non-investors is earlier than
the investor. The value added by a non-investor in such an order is zero, whereas the value added
by the investor and the non-investor together is assigned to the investor. Second, one of the four
axioms underlying the Shapley value requires that identical players have to have identical Shapley
values. So, the decreasing share of the surplus going to the non-investor has to be split equally
between an increasing number of substitutes. If the party is an investor, then it is obvious that its
incentives to invest are diminished when identical rivals benefit from the positive externality of the
investment. This is the classic public good problem.
3 The participation constraint formulates the circumstances under which the investor invests. It is an
inequality which states that the revenues of the investment for the investor are not smaller than the
costs of investment (k). The revenues of the investment of the investor are equal to the Shapley
value of the investor in our model.
7Table 2 implies a ranking regarding the suitability of the various ownership structures with
respect to the specific investments.4 The ranking of maximum possible investment outlays by party
1 for the various ownership structures is:
III < I < II.
Ownership structure II is always first-best efficient regarding the specific investment of party 1,
i.e. every surplus generating investment by party 1 will be implemented under ownership structure
II, regardless of the value of k1. The reason is that all benefits of the investment accrue to party 1.
The ranking of maximum possible outlays regarding the investment k2 by party 2 for the
various ownership structures is:
II < I < III.
The ranking of efficient ownership structures for party 1 and party 2 is presented in figure 2. It
shows which ownership structures are first best efficient as a function of the sunk costs of each
party. The smaller the specificity of investment, the more ownership structures yield the first best
efficient outcome. With higher levels of investment, fewer ownership structures are efficient. For
instance, if f<k2£1,5f and t<k1£1,5t, then only I is first best efficient. The general result is that a
first best ownership structure assigns more power to a party when its sunk costs / quasi-surplus
ratio increases, ceteris paribus.5
                                                
4 The ordinal ranking of the ownership structures is to be interpreted as a ‘reduced form’ of an
underlying model (Williamson, 1991). The reduced form is to be seen as a way to deal with the
early stage of the development of the theory of the firm (cf. Holmstrom and Roberts). The empiri-
cal importance of ordinal rankings is that they formulate some constraints with respect to the data.
To be more specific, various changes in the choice of ownership structure as a function of the level
of asset specificity are predicted not to happen. If they occur anyway in reality, then this will cast
serious doubts on the relevance of the model.
5 The choice of ownership structure is in our model driven by efficiency considerations only. How-
ever, considerations of equity may prevent that the first best ownership structure will be chosen. A
possible solution is to accompany the choice of ownership structure with a lump sum transfer
scheme.
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2f
III A B
1,5f
I, III I C
f
I, II, III I, II II
   0 t    1,5t        2t     k1
Figure 2. First-best efficient ownership structures
In the area in the upper right corner of the figure no first best efficient combination of investments
is possible. If investments of 1 and 2 fall in the area A, B or C only second best efficient owner-
ship structures are possible. This means that only one of the two parties will invest. The second
best ownership structure choice in region A is III when 2f-k2³1.5t-k1 and I or II otherwise.
Similarly, the second best ownership structure choice in region C is II when 2t-k1³1.5f-k2 and I
or III otherwise. Finally, the second best ownership structure choice in region B is II when 2t-
k1³2f-k2 and III otherwise. The general result is that the second best ownership structure assigns
more power to a party when the surplus of its investment increases, ceteris paribus.
6. The model: three parties
Now we will present the model for the three party chain. There are three parties (1, 2 and 3),
three assets (A1, A2 and A3) and three investment decisions (x1, x2 and x3). For simplicity, xi can
only take the value 0 or 1. The three parties together make up an agrifood supply chain; they each
represent a specific stage in this chain. For instance, party 1 is a farmer, party 2 is a processing
firm and party 3 is a retail firm. The assets are, for instance, land, factory and shop.
Once again, we assume complementarities in asset use. An investment by party 1 gener-
ates a higher value if not only asset A1 but also A2 and A3 are used. The notion of a chain entails
that there is a difference between being in the middle or at the end of the chain. We capture this
by assuming that the value generated by the investment will be higher if two adjacent assets are
used than if two non-adjacent assets are used. In the three-party agrifood chain this means that
the positive externalities of the investment of the farmer (party 1) is higher for the processing
company (party 2) than for the retailer (party 3). The quasi-surplus for various investment deci-
sions and various assets used is shown in table 3, where the difference between adjacent and
non-adjacent assets is captured by a < 1 and b  < 1.
Table 3. Quasi-surplus for three investment decisions and various as sets involved
9assets involved investment decision q
A1 x1=1 t
A1  A2 x1=1 2t
A1  A3 x1=1 (1 + a)t
A1  A2  A3 x1=1 (2 + a)t
A2 x2=1 f
A1  A2 x2=1 2f
A2  A3 x2=1 2f
A1  A2  A3 x2=1 3f
A3 x3=1 h
A1  A3 x3=1 (1 + b)h
A2  A3 x3=1 2h
A1  A2  A3 x3=1 (2 + b)h
The full quasi-surplus of each investment will be generated when all assets in the chain are used.
Various divisions of asset ownership are possible. We have distinguished 10 different ownership
structures. Figure 3 shows for each of the ten ownership structures the assets that each party
owns. For instance, ownership structure V holds if asset A2 and A3 are both owned by party 3
and asset A1 is separately owned by party 1. Ownership structure II is an expression of the
agricultural marketing cooperative, where farmers own the processing company at the second
stage of the chain. Thus, in a marketing cooperative party 1 owns A1 and A2, while party 3 owns
A3.
         I       II        III        IV         V         VI        VII       VIII         IX        X
party 1         A1    A       a      A       A      A         a            A      a  a
party 2         A2     a          A         A       a      A        A           a      A  a
party 3         A3     A          A       a       A      a         A           a  a  A
  a : asset, non-owner
  A : asset, owner
: combined ownership
Figure 3. Ten ownership structure
The bargaining power of each party in the supply chain under the various ownership structures is
captured by its Shapley value. The Shapley value is computed for each ownership structures and
each investment by using the characteristic function. An example will illustrate this. Suppose party
1 invests (i.e. x1 = 1) and the choice of ownership structure is I (G = I). The characteristic func-
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tion is:
N = {1,2,3}
v ( Æ | I , (1,0,0)) = 0
v ( 1 | I, (1,0,0)) = t
v ( 2 | I, (1,0,0)) = 0
v ( 3 | I, (1,0,0)) = 0
v ( 12 | I, (1,0,0)) = 2t
v ( 13 | I, (1,0,0)) = (1+a)t
v ( 23 | I, (1,0,0)) = 0
v ( 123 | I, (1,0,0)) = (2+a)t
Table 4 presents the computation of the Shapley values for ownership structure I and investment
by party 1. The Shapley value is an allocation of payoffs to each player. The payoff assigned to a
player is equal to the average marginal contribution he makes to each coalition to which he could
belong, where all coalitions are regarded as equally likely. The incentive to invest is equal to the
Shapley value divided by the total surplus which can be generated. We illustrate the numbers in
table 4 by elaborating on two possible orders in which the grand coalition of all players can be
formed. Consider first the order 123. The marginal value added by player 1 is v ( 1 | I, (1,0,0)) -
v ( Æ | I , (1,0,0)) = t - 0 = t. The marginal value added by player 2 is v ( 12 | I, (1,0,0)) - v ( 1 |
I , (1,0,0)) = 2t - t = t. The marginal value added by player 3 is v ( 123 | I, (1,0,0)) - v ( 12 | I ,
(1,0,0)) = (2+a)t - 2t = at. The marginal contribution of each player in order 312 is computed
similarly. The marginal value added by player 3 is v ( 3 | I, (1,0,0)) - v ( Æ | I , (1,0,0)) = 0 - 0 =
0. The marginal value added by player 1 is v ( 13 | I, (1,0,0)) - v ( 3 | I , (1,0,0)) = (1+a)t - 0  =
(1+a)t. The marginal value added by player 2 is v ( 123 | I, (1,0,0)) - v ( 13 | I , (1,0,0)) =
(2+a)t - (1+a)t  = t.
Table 4. Shapley values for ownership structure I and investment by party 1
order in coalition S party 1 party 2 party 3 total
(123) t t at (2+a)t
(132) t t at (2+a)t
(213) 2t 0 at (2+a)t
(231) (2+a)t 0 0 (2+a)t
(312) (1+a)t t 0 (2+a)t
(321) (2+a)t 0 0 (2+a)t
sum of marginal
contributions
(9+3a)t 3t 3at (12+6a)t
Shapley value (9+3a)t/6 t/2 at/2 (2+a)t
Incentive to invest  (9+3a)/(12+6a) 3/(12+6a) 3a/(12+6a) 1
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Similarly we can compute the Shapley values for the other ownership structures as well as for
other investing parties. As we have assumed non-cooperative investment decisions, only the
Shapley value of the investing party is relevant for its investment decision. Appendix A provides
all characteristic functions and the corresponding Shapley values for each investment decisions
and all ownership structures. This entails 30 cases. The (investment) participation constraint for
party 1 under ownership structure I is
k1  £  (9+3a)t/6  =  (1.5 + 0.5a)t.
Table 5 gives the maximum costs of investment of each investing party under the 10 different
ownership structures. It follows immediately from table A-2 in  appendix A.
Table 5. Maximum investment levels under various ownership structures
ownership
structure
max. investment
 by party 1
max. investment
by party 2
max investment
by party 3
I (1.5 + 0.5a)t 2f (1.5 + 0.5b)h
II (2 + 0.5a)t 4/3f (1.5 + 0.5b)h
III (1 + 1/3a)t 2.5f (1.5 + 0.5b)h
IV (1.5 + 0.5a)t 2.5f (1 + 1/3b)h
V (1.5 + 0.5a)t 4/3f (2 + 0.5b)h
VI (1.5 + a)t 2f (5/6 + 0.5b)h
VII 5/6 + 0.5a)t 2f (1.5 + b)h
VIII (2 + a)t 1.5f 1 + 0.5b)h
IX (1 + 0.5a)t 3f 1 + 0.5b)h
X (1 + 0.5a)t 1.5f (2 + b)h
Efficient ownership structures in a chain
An ownership structure is first-best efficient if all three parties invest and each investment gener-
ates surplus, i.e. if x = (1,1,1) and ki £ qi, for i = 1,2,3. To find out whether a particular combina-
tion of investments will yield the first-best, we use the participation constraints of the three parties,
i.e. k1 £ SV1, k2 £ SV2 and k3 £ SV3.
Table 5 implies a ranking regarding the suitability of the various ownership structures with
respect to the specific investments. The ranking of maximum possible investment outlays by party
1 for the various ownership structures is:
VII < III < IX/X < I/IV/V < VI < II < VIII.
Ownership structure VIII is always first-best efficient regarding the specific investment of party 1,
i.e. every surplus generating investment by party 1 will be implemented under ownership structure
VIII regardless of the value of k1. The reason is that all benefits of the investment accrue to party
1.
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Because the positive externalities of investment are not fully taken into account when the
investing party makes its investment decision, under-investment may result. For example, party 1
will invest under ownership structure II when k1 Î [0, (2+0.5a)t], but not when k1 Î ((2+0.5a)t,
¥). Ownership structure II is inefficient for high levels of k1, i.e. k1 Î ((2+0.5a)t, (2+a)t), be-
cause party 1 does not take the full positive externality of investment for party 3 into account in its
investment decision. Ownership structure VI is less efficient than ownership structure II. The
difference between these two ownership structures is that party 1 owns the assets at stage 1 and
2 under ownership structure II, whereas ownership structure VI entails ownership of the assets at
stage 1 and 3 by party 1 (see figure 3). Investment by party 1 generates more value in stage 2
than in stage 3, therefore ownership structure II is superior to ownership structure VI with respect
to investment by party 1. Ownership structures I, IV, and V are identical and dominated by
ownership structure VI from the viewpoint of the investment by party 1 because in I, IV and V
party 1 only owns the asset at the first stage of the chain. Ownership structure IX and X are
identical with respect to investment incentives for party 1: party 1 is indispensable because it
makes the investment, while the other party, i.e. party 2 in IX and party 3 in X, is indispensable
because it owns the assets in all stages. Ownership structure III is less efficient than ownership
structures IX and X because here party 1 has to negotiate with two other parties instead of one
other party under IX and X. Finally, ownership structure VII is the least efficient with respect to
the investment incentives for party 1. It is even less efficient than ownership structure III because
the combination of parties 1 and 2 in ownership structure III generate more surplus than the
combination of 1 and 3 in ownership structure VII.
The ranking of maximum possible outlays regarding the investment k2 by party 2for the
various ownership structures is:
II/V < VIII/X < I/VI/VII < III/IV < IX.
Similarly, the ranking of maximum possible outlays regarding the investment k3 by party 3for the
various ownership structures is:
VI < IV < VIII/IX < I/II/III < VII < V < X.
The explanation of these rankings is similar to that of party 1 and will therefore not be presented.
These three rankings can be put in a three dimensional diagram with k1, k2, k3 on the
axes. This diagram represents first-best efficient ownership structures. For reasons of simplicity it
is sliced into six two-dimensional figures, with each figure representing a range of values of k2. In
figure 4 we have set the investment by party 2 at k2 £ 1.33f. At this level party 2 will always
invest.
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X X X
V, X V, X V, X V
VII, V, X V, X V, X V
I, II, III, V,
VII, X
I, II, III, V,
X I, II, V, X I, II, V II II
I, II, III, V,
VII, VIII,
IX, X
I, II, III, V,
VII,  VIII,
IX, X
I, II, V,
VIII, IX, X
I, II, V,
VIII
II,
VIII II, VIII VIII
I, II, III, IV,
VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, II, III, IV,
V, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, II, IV, V,
VIII, IX, X
I, II, IV,
V, VIII
II,
VIII II, VIII VIII
I, II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, II, IV, V,
VI, VIII,
IX, X
I, II, IV,
V, VI,
VIII
II, VI,
VIII II, VIII VIII
Figure 4. First-best efficient ownership structures for k2  £  1.33f
The next step is finding first-best efficient ownership structures for a higher investment by party 2:
1.33f < k2 £ 1.5f. Figure 5 presents this slice. Now ownership structures II and V are no longer
first-best efficient. Additional figures, shown in appendix B, show that:
- if 1.5f < k2 £ 2f, then VIII and X are no longer first-best efficient;
- if 2f < k2 £ 2.5f, then I, VI and VII are no longer first-best efficient;
- if 2.5f < k2 £ 3f, then III and IV are no longer first-best efficient;
- if k2 > 3f, then no ownership structure is first-best efficient.
           (5/6+0.5a)t       (1+1/3a)t        (1+0.5a)t    (1.5+0.5a)t   (1.5+ a)t    (2+0.5a)t    (2+a)t k1
                k3
        (2+b)h
   (2+0.5b)h
     (1.5+b)h
(1.5+0.5b)h
   (1+0.5b)h
   (1+1/3b)h
(5/6+0.5b)h
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X X X
X X X
VII, X X X
I, III, VII,
X I, III, X I, X I
I, III, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, III, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, VIII,
IX, X I, VIII VIII VIII VIII
I, III, IV,
VII, VIII,
IX, X
I, III, IV,
VII, VIII,
IX,  X
I, IV,
VIII, IX,
X
I, IV,
VIII VIII VIII VIII
I, III, IV,
VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, III, IV,
VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
I, IV, VI,
VIII, IX,
X
I, IV,
VI, VIII VI, VIII VIII VIII
Figure 5.   First-best efficient ownership structures for 1.33f < k2  £  1.5f
It follows from figures 4 and 5 (and the ones in appendix B) that each possible ownership struc-
ture can be uniquely first-best efficient. The ordering of efficient ownership structures for each
investing party shows that a change in ownership structure at the same time makes investing more
attractive for one party and less attractive for other parties. If a shift in ownership structure
strengthens party i’s bargaining position then it will weaken party j’s bargaining position. Certain
combinations of investment decisions of the three parties are only viable under a specific owner-
ship structure.
An interesting case is ownership structure II: the farmer owns both the land and the fac-
tory, and the retailer owns the shop. An example of this structure could be a farmer-owned
marketing cooperative (MC) producing special (organic) dairy products and selling to an inde-
pendent retailer. Each party in this supply chain is making specific investments, but the relative
sizes of these investments differ. Figures 4 and 5 show that ownership structure II is the only first-
best efficient structure if and only if (1.5+0.5a)t < k1 £ (2+0.5a)t, 0 < k2 £ 1.33f, and
(1+0.5b)h < k3 £ (1.5+0.5b)h. Here the farmer’s specific investment is relatively large compared
to the investments by the processor and the retailer (i.e. k1/q1 > k2/q2 and k1/q1 > k3/q3). If the
farmer’s investment is smaller, then also I and V are first-best efficient. With ownership structure I
each party owns an asset, and with ownership structure V the processing plant and the shop are
           (5/6+0.5a)t       (1+1/3a)t        (1+0.5a)t    (1.5+0.5a)t   (1.5+ a)t    (2+0.5a)t    (2+a)t      k1
                k3
        (2+b)h
   (2+0.5b)h
     (1.5+b)h
(1.5+0.5b)h
   (1+0.5b)h
   (1+1/3b)h
(5/6+0.5b)h
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both owned by the retailer. If the investment by the retailer is smaller, i.e. k3 £ (1+0.5b)h, then
also VIII becomes first-best efficient. Ownership structure VIII means that the farmer owns all
three assets. This situation of full chain integration will only yield the social optimum if the specific
investments by the processor and retailer are much smaller than the investment by the farmer.
Ownership structure II does not show up anymore in figure 5, indicating that an increase
in k2 will reduce the attractiveness of an MC as a ownership structure. When the specific invest-
ment by party 2 increases relative to the investments by parties 1 and 3, an MC can no longer
deal with the hold-up problem, thus leading to inefficiency. Because an MC is geared towards the
interests of the farmer (party 1), expressed by farmer-ownership of the processing firm, invest-
ments by party 2 face the threat of hold up by the farmers. The conclusion is that if a coopera-
tively owned processing firm needs relatively high specific investments, for instance to enhance or
to maintain its competitiveness, a shift from MC to another ownership structure may be neces-
sary. The recent restructuring of MCs into the incorporation of non-farmers as providers of equity
capital,  can be understood from this point of view.
7. Comparative statics results
A number of comparative statics results can be derived from this model. First, the set of efficient
ownership structures shrinks when k/q increases, i.e. when the specific costs of investment in-
creases relative to the surplus it generates. When k/q increases, the ownership structure has to be
more fine-tuned in order to prevent hold-up problems. Another way of formulating this result is
that an increase in the value of q, given the level of k, will increase the set of efficient ownership
structures. The increase in the share of the surplus in the quasi-surplus provides more leeway in
the choice of ownership structure such that both parties feel secure that their investments will be
recouped. In the cells in the upper right corner of figure 4 and 5 there is no first-best ownership
structure, i.e. there is no ownership structure that is able to obtain the first-best when k1 as well as
k3 have a high value (relative to the size of q).6
Second, many agricultural markets are nowadays surplus instead of shortage markets.
The response of more product differentiation and more vertical coordination entails a higher level
of asset specificity, thus increasing k/q.. Third, the globalization of markets entails more competi-
tion, i.e. the surplus is reduced and therefore k/q is increased. This makes it more difficult to
establish the first best outcome. Finally, what happens if a or b  increases, i.e. if the complemen-
tarities of the chain increase? A higher value of a means that the specific investment by party 1
generates a higher quasi-surplus. This results in a shift to the right of the borderlines between the
cells in figures 1 and 2. This implies that with given investment levels for parties 1, 2 and 3 more
ownership structures are now first-best efficient (also showing that less integrated structures
become efficient for party 1). A similar argument is valid for the value of b . In general we see that
a higher quasi-surplus of a given investment makes more ownership structures efficient.
8. Conclusions
                                                
6 Which ownership structures are second best efficient depends on the relative size of the parties’
investment decisions.
16
Incomplete contract theory predicts that asset ownership has effect on parties’ incentives to
invest. This effect is due to the impossibility to write comprehensive contingent contracts for
relationship-specific investments and the resulting potential for opportunistic behaviour and ex
post renegotiation over the trade benefits. This risk of hold up leads to under-investments.
Changing the allocation of asset ownership between the trading parties may solve (part of) the
hold up problem.
Our model shows that optimal asset ownership is determined by the specific investment
cost/quasi-surplus ratio for party A compared to the specific investment cost/quasi-surplus ratio
for party B when first best efficiency is attainable. If this ratio is higher for party A then for party
B, than party A should own most of the assets that are used in generating the quasi-surplus. In
other words, if the specific investment by A generates a smaller surplus (relative to the investment)
than the specific investment by party B does, A should own more assets in order to obtain the
efficient investment decisions. The second best ownership structure choice assigns most power to
the party generating the highest surplus.
The model has been presented as a chain consisting of three parties, e.g. a farmer, a
processor and a retailer. A three party chain consisting of a plant breeder, a farmer and a retailer
can be analyzed in the same way. The same results will of course hold, but the MC is in such a
chain represented by ownership structure IV instead of ownership structure II.
Vertical co-ordination in the agrifood sector often requires aligning activities of more than
two parties. In this paper we have applied the incomplete contract model to a three-party supply
chain. Each party can make chain-specific investments, meaning that the investments yield higher
benefits within this specific supply chain than outside the chain. Whether parties are actually willing
to make those chain-specific investments depends on the division of value in case of ex post
renegotiation. The bargaining power in this renegotiation process is determined by the ownership
of assets that are essential for the investment (i.e. without access to these assets the investment
will generate no or lower value).
If changes in technology or changes in agrifood markets shift the relative importance of
the individual investments by different chain partners, e.g. if retailer investment becomes more
important than farmer investment, it may be necessary to change the allocation of ownership of
essential assets to induce parties to make those investments that generate the chain optimum. In
other words, it may be necessary to change the ownership structure of agrifood chains to obtain
that combination of investment decisions that yields the first-best. The model we have presented
may contribute to determine ownership structures that induce maximum value generating.
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Appendix A. Characteristic functions and Shapley values
Table A-1. Characteristic functions
The incentive to invest is determined by the bargaining power of the investor in a particular own-
ership structure and the bargaining position which is implied by the level of investment. There are
ten possible ownership structures and three types of investment. Thirty different characteristic
functions have therefore to be analysed in order to determine the level of investment of each party
and the efficient choice of ownership structure. Table A-1 presents the characteristic functions.
We will explain the numbers of the rows seven and eight, i.e. ownership structures VI and
VII (see figure 3), of this table in order to illustrate its construction. Assume that player 1 invests.
Coalitions without player 1 have value 0 because player 1 has to invest and is therefore essential.
This implies v(2) = v(3) = v(23) = 0. If all players are in the coalition then the whole surplus is of
course created by this coalition, i.e. v(123) = (2+a)t. Compare ownership structure VI with
ownership structure VII. Player 3 adds no value in ownership structure VI to a coalition of which
player 1 is already a member because player 1 owns the assets at the third stage. This implies
v(1) = v(13) and v(12) = v(123). The coalition of player 1 adds a value of (1+a)t because he
owns the assets at stage 1 and 3, i.e. v(1) = (1+a)t. The coalition of the players 1 and 2 gener-
ates the whole surplus because together they own all the assets, i.e. v(12) = (2+a)t. The players
1 and 3 are both essential in ownership structure VII because player 1 invests and player 3 owns
the assets at stage 1. This implies v(1) = 0 and v(12) = 0. Player 2 is essential for the players 1
and 3 for generating the value with his asset, i.e. v(13) = (1+a)t.
x G v(1) v(2) v(3) v(12) v(13) v(23) v(123)
(1,0,0) I t 0 0 2t (1+a)t 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) II 2t 0 0 2t (2+a)t 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) III 0 0 0 2t 0 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) IV t 0 0 (2+a)t t 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) V t 0 0 t (2+a)t 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) VI (1+a)t 0 0 (2+a)t (1+a)t 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) VII 0 0 0 0 (1+a)t 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) VIII (2+a)t 0 0 (2+a)t (2+a)t 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) IX 0 0 0 (2+a)t 0 0 (2+a)t
(1,0,0) X 0 0 0 0 (2+a)t 0 (2+a)t
(0,1,0) I 0 f 0 2f 0 2f 3f
(0,1,0) II 0 0 0 2f 0 0 3f
(0,1,0) III 0 2f 0 2f 0 3f 3f
(0,1,0) IV 0 2f 0 3f 0 2f 3f
(0,1,0) V 0 0 0 0 0 2f 3f
(0,1,0) VI 0 f 0 3f 0 f 3f
(0,1,0) VII 0 f 0 f 0 3f 3f
(0,1,0) VIII 0 0 0 3f 0 0 3f
(0,1,0) IX 0 3f 0 3f 0 3f 3f
(0,1,0) X 0 0 0 0 0 3f 3f
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(0,0,1) I 0 0 h 0 (1+b)h 2h (2+b)h
(0,0,1) II 0 0 h 0 (2+b)h h (2+b)h
(0,0,1) III 0 0 h 0 h (2+b)h (2+b)h
(0,0,1) IV 0 0 0 0 0 2h (2+b)h
(0,0,1) V 0 0 2h 0 (2+b)h 2h (2+b)h
(0,0,1) VI 0 0 0 0 (1+b)h 0 (2+b)h
(0,0,1) VII 0 0 (1+b)h 0 (1+b)h (2+b)h (2+b)h
(0,0,1) VIII 0 0 0 0 (2+b)h 0 (2+b)h
(0,0,1) IX 0 0 0 0 0 (2+b)h (2+b)h
(0,0,1) X 0 0 (2+b)h 0 (2+b)h (2+b)h (2+b)h
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Table A-2. Shapley values
The Shapley value is used to determine the appropriation rate. First, it allocates the surplus which
the investment of an investor generates between the three parties. Second, it is used to determine
the incentive to invest, which is equal to the Shapley value divided by the quasi-surplus. Notice
that for each particular case the Shapley value specifies an appropriation rate for all the three
parties and of course only the incentive to invest of the investor.
x G Shapley valueparty 1
Shapley value
party 2
Shapley value
party 3
(1,0,0) I (1.5+0.5a)t 1/2t 0.5at
(1,0,0) II (2+0.5a)t 0 0.5at
(1,0,0) III (1+1/3a)t (1+1/3a)t 1/3at
(1,0,0) IV (1.5+0.5a)t (0.5+0.5a)t 0
(1,0,0) V (1.5+0.5a)t 0 (0.5+0.5a)t
(1,0,0) VI (1.5+a)t 1/2t 0
(1,0,0) VII (5/6+0.5a)t 1/3t (5/6+0.5a)t
(1,0,0) VIII (2+a)t 0 0
(1,0,0) IX (1+0.5a)t (1+0.5a)t 0
(1,0,0) X (1+0.5a)t 0 (1+0.5a)t
(0,1,0) I 1/2f 2f 1/2f
(0,1,0) II 4/3f 4/3f 1/3f
(0,1,0) III 0 2.5f 1/2f
(0,1,0) IV 1/2f 2.5f 0
(0,1,0) V 1/3f 4/3f 4/3f
(0,1,0) VI f 2f 0
(0,1,0) VII 0 2f f
(0,1,0) VIII 1.5f 1.5f 0
(0,1,0) IX 0 3f 0
(0,1,0) X 0 1.5f 1.5f
(0,0,1) I 0.5bh 0.5h (1.5+0.5b)h
(0,0,1) II (0.5+0.5b)h 0 (1.5+0.5b)h
(0,0,1) III 0 (0.5+0.5b)h (1.5+0.5b)h
(0,0,1) IV 1/3bh (1+b/3)h (1+b/3)h
(0,0,1) V 0.5bh 0 (2+0.5b)h
(0,0,1) VI (5/6+0.5b)h 1/3h (5/6+0.5b)h
(0,0,1) VII 0 0.5h (1.5+b)h
(0,0,1) VIII (1+0.5b)h 0 (1+0.5b)h
(0,0,1) IX 0 (1+0.5b)h (1+0.5b)h
(0,0,1) X 0 0 (2+b)h
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Appendix B.
Figure B.1.   First-best efficient ownership structures for 1.5f < k2  £ 2f
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IX
I, III, IV, IX I, IV, IX I, IV
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VII, IX
 I, III, IV, VI,
IX
I, IV, VI, IX  I, IV, VI VI
Figure B-2.   First-best efficient ownership structures for 2f < k2  £ 2.5f
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Figure B-3   First-best efficient ownership structures for 2.5f < k2  £ 3f
IX IX IX
IX IX IX
IX  IX IX
There are no first-best efficient ownership structures for k2  > 3f because the investment is larger
than the quasi-surplus.
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